Abstract: Strong designated verifier signature (generally abbreviated to SDVS) allows signers to obtain absolute control over who can verify the signature, while only the designated verifier other than anyone else can verify the validity of a SDVS without being able to transfer the conviction. Certificateless PKC has unique advantages comparing with certificate-based cryptosystems and identity-based PKC, without suffering from key escrow. Motivated by these attractive features, we propose a novel efficient CL-SDVS scheme without bilinear pairings or map-to-point hash operations. The proposed scheme achieves all the required security properties including EUF-CMA, non-transferability, strongness and non-delegatability. We also estimate the computational and communication efficiency. The comparison shows that our scheme outperforms all the previous CL-(S)DVS schemes. Furthermore, the crucial security properties of the CL-SDVS scheme are formally proved based on the intractability of SCDH and ECDL assumptions in random oracle model.
INTRODUCTION
Traditional digital signature scheme with the publicverifiable property does not fit the requirement of various scenarios, such as deniable authentication, e-bidding, evoting. To settle this problem, Jakobsson [1] put forward a new concept called designated verifier signature (generally abbreviated to DVS). The most attractive property of DVS is called non-transferability, which ensures signers to obtain absolute control over who can verify the signature. In addition, the designated verifier cannot convince any third entity of the fact the DVS is indeed signed by the genuine signer. Meanwhile, a variant of DVS called Strong designated verifier signature (SDVS) is also proposed. None other than the designated verifier can verify the SDVS. We call this property the strongness property, which is usually achieved by forcing the verification process using the designated verifier's secret. The formalized definition was first formed by Saeednia [2] and extended by Laguillaumie [3] . Later on, Lipmaa et al. [4] pointed out that most previous (S)DVS schemes [2, [5] [6] suffer from a new-type attack named delegatability, in which the signer could delegate his/her signing ability to any third entity by transferring a common value without revealing the secret key. To capture this issue, the security notion of non-delegatability was proposed and formalized. Due to these unique properties above, the SDVS can help resolve the conflict between authentication and privacy protection in digital signatures, thus fit into various cryptographic applications and some new fields, such as IoT communications [7] , biometric authentication and identity-management [8] , privacy preserving cloud computing, the next-generation network infrastructure [9] , and so on.
Following Saeednia et al.'s work, many identity-based (S)DVS schemes were proposed [10] [11] [12] [13] . And recently Shooshtari et al. [14] presented a code-based SDVS scheme against quantum attacks. Unfortunately, all the above identity-based (S)DVS schemes suffer from the inherent problem of key escrow in ID-based cryptosystems. Certificateless public key cryptography, which was originally introduced by Al-Riyami et al. [15] , can address this problem. It relies on a semi-trusted KGC who owns the master secret key. The full secret key of arbitrary user was deduced from two parts: partial private key Di supplied from KGC, and secret value x i chosen by himself. Thus, it has unique advantages comparing with certificate-based cryptosystems and identity-based PKC, without suffering from the problem of key escrow.
Motivated by this attractive feature, Huang [16] presented the first construction of certificateless DVS scheme. However, their scheme is figured out to be vulnerable to malicious-but-passive KGC attacks. Later on, some efficient short certificateless DVS schemes were independently designed [17] [18] [19] and claimed to be secure. However, most of them [17] [18] still need several pairing operations and the previous one does not resist the public key replace attack. Recently, several certificateless strong DVS schemes (CL-SDVS for short) have been proposed [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] . Unfortunately, some of them cannot achieve all the security properties as they claimed. According to [25] , the scheme in Reference [22] is insecure against the malicious PKC attack and public key replacement attack. The CL-SDVS scheme proposed in Reference [24] is pointed vulnerable to concrete attack which shows the signature is forgeable [26] . Recalling the proofs of previous insecure schemes [16] [17] [18] 22] , we find that there is an inappropriate restriction in their security models of unforgeability. The adversary cannot query target signer or the target verifier to sign arbitrary message, nor to check the validity of any signature. With these restrictions, they actually ignore such a practical attack in which the adversary can query arbitrary signature on arbitrary message with respect to arbitrary signer and verifier, or the adversary can eavesdrop all communications between signer and verifier. Thus, the previous models are not adequately considered and essentially limit the adversary's abilities. Therefore, we consider a strictly stronger security model in Section 4. Moreover, expensive operations such as bilinear pairing, pairing-based exponentiation, and mapto-hash operations are required in all existing schemes. And the computation cost is still maintained at a high level.
This paper presents a novel efficient certificateless SDVS scheme with shorter signature size, achieving all the required security properties of strongness, nontransferability, non-delegatability and EUF-CMA against both Type I and Type II forgers. The unforgeability for our scheme is formally proved based on Square Computational Diffie-Hellman (SCDH) assumption and Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm (ECDL) assumption in random oracle model, of which the SCDH assumption is equivalent to the CDH assumption [27] .And the proof of non-delegatability is strictly following the formalized definition originally introduced by Lipmaa [4] . Furthermore, our scheme does not need expensive pairing operations, which are making it more efficient than all the existing CL-SDVS schemes proposed so far. Due to its security and efficiency, our CL-SDVS scheme can be deployed in various powerconstrained applications, such as sensor networks, IoT and cyber-physical systems.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the formal definition of certificateless SDVS scheme. We also describe the formalized model of crucial security properties, including unforgeability and non-delegatability. In Section 3, we propose a novel efficient certificateless SDVS scheme. The performance and security are analyzed in the next two sections. The last section concludes this paper.
MODELS OF CL-SDVS SCHEMES 2.1 Definition of CL-SDVS
A certificateless strong designated verifier signature (CL-SDVS) scheme consists of eight algorithms shown as the following:
• Setup: This PPT algorithm runs by the KGC. Taking the security parameter κ as input, it outputs the public parameters params and the master secret key msk.
• Partial-Private-Key-Extract: This PPT algorithm runs by KGC. Taking params, msk and ID∈{0,1}* (which is the identity of a user) as input, it returns the corresponding partial private key dID.
• Set-Secret-Value: This PPT algorithm runs by a user with identity ID. 
Security Model of CL-SDVS Schemes
A secure certificateless SDVS scheme must achieve four crucial security properties: unforgeability, strongness, non-transferability, and non-delegatability.
Unforgeability. This property ensures that no one can forge a valid CL-SDVS with non-negligible probability without obtaining the private key of either the signer or the designated verifier. Depending on the different capabilities, we can divide the forger in certificateless SDVS schemes into two types. The description and formalization of these forgers is given below.  can obtain params, the identity and public keys of the singer S and the specified verifier V.
• Queries: The forger σ on m.
• Output: Eventually, I
 produces a forgery ( )  also can both obtain.
• Queries: The forger II  can get access to the following oracles, which are the same as in Game I:
, and SIMUL(m, ID S , ID V ).
• 
Strongness.
The verification process needs to use the specified verifier's secret, without which any third entity cannot confirm whether a signature is valid.
Non-transferability. Given arbitrary message m and the corresponding signature σ generated by the signer, it is computationally indistinguishable from the simulation ' σ produced by the specified verifier.
Non-delegatability. The signer cannot delegate his/her signing ability to any third entity by transferring a common value without revealing the secret key.
Assume that  denotes the delegated entity by the real signer, who can generate a valid signature in time τ with a non-negligible probability ε . Then we can construct an efficient black-box knowledge extractor E based on the algorithm  . Suppose  can produce a valid 
is the knowledge error. The time cost making the oracle queries is negligible here. If such an E exists, the CL-SDVS scheme is ( , )
τ r -non-delegatable.
PROPOSED CL-SDVS SCHEME
This section presents an efficient Certificateless SDVS scheme without using any expensive pairing computation or map-to-point hash operation. Our scheme satisfies all the required security properties including unforgeability, non-transferability, strongness and non-delegatability. The signature length is also obviously reduced. The construction of our CL-SDVS scheme is as follows: 
The correctness of the CL-SDVS scheme is proved following from the fact that ( )( )
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SECURITY ANALYSIS
The computational assumptions on which the security proof relies are briefly described below.
Definition 1 (Square Computational Diffie-Hellman (SCDH) Problem): Given a q-order cyclic additive group  generated by an element P. On input P and aP, computing a 2 P.
Definition 2 (SCDH Assumption): Let  be a SCDH-adversary who can succeed in solving the SCDH problem within time t with the probability of ( ). 
Theorem 1.
If the SCDH assumption holds, then our proposed CL-SDVS scheme is existential unforgeable against Type I forger under chosen message attacks in the random oracle model.
Proof. Given a SCDH instance (A, B) = (aP, P), in which * q a ∈  is an unknown random value and P ∈ .
Suppose I  be a successful forger against our CL-SDVS scheme. Then an algorithm  can be constructed by running I  as a subroutine to break the SCDH problem. The aim of  is to compute a 
P.
Algorithm  simulates the attack environment. And system parameters are published to I  , in which the master public key is pub P A aP = = . In this formula, a is the master private key and should be kept secret to  . The oracle queries of forger I  are simulated as follows:
• , ID j , m, T, c 1i , c 2i ) • • SIGN (ID i , ID j , m) •
by itself, and returns whatever it gets.
• VERI (ID i , ID j , m, σ 
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S pub e e t w e e P Proof. Given an ECDLP instance (A, B) = (aP, P), in which * q a ∈  is an unknown random value and ∈ P  .
Suppose II  be a successful forger against our CL-SDVS scheme. Then an algorithm  can be constructed by running II  as a subroutine to break the ECDLP problem. The aim of  is to compute a.
Algorithm  simulates the attack environment as follows. It sets msk by selecting a random value * q s ∈  , and caculates master public key P pub =sP. Then public parameters are released, and msk =s is sent to II  , simulates the oracle queries of II  .We only describe
ReqestPK(ID i ) oracle below without losing generality, since other oracles are essentially the same as in Theorem 1.
• , ID V , m, T, c 1 , c 2 ) . Meanwhile, by executing Simulation algorithm, the designated verifier ID V can also compute valid signatures. For arbitrary probabilistic polynomial-time distinguisher, it is infeasible to discriminate whether the signatrure is caculated by a real signer, or simulated by the specified verifier.
Theorem 5. Our CL-SDVS scheme satisfies strongness.
Proof. The Verify algorithm in our CL-SDVS scheme needs to use the private key = V ID V SK w of the designated verifier. This would guarantee that any third entity cannot verify the validity or invalidity of the signature, without obtaining the corresponding private key. More precisely, any third party cannot distinguish the signature from a random string with identical length and distribution. Thus our proposed scheme inherently satisfies the security property of strongness. 
We provide a security comparison of our proposed scheme with known existing CL-DVS schemes (H-scheme [16] , D-scheme [18] , C-scheme [17] , Y-scheme [23] , Xscheme [22] and I-scheme [21] ) in Tab. 1, which demonstrates that most existing schemes cannot satisfy all the required security properties, while ours can achieve all.
We also provide formal security proofs of unforgeability against both Type I and Type II forgers, non-transferability, strongness and non-delegatability above. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first CL-SDVS scheme without pairings that provides formal security proof of nondelegatability.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
As shown in Tab. 2, we present a performance comparison of the proposed CL-SDVS with H-scheme [16] , C-scheme [17] , Y-scheme [23] , X-scheme [22] and Ischeme [20] . The analysis inculdes the required computational cost of signing or verifying a siganature, and the communication cost which is measured by the signature length. Here we omit the cost of conventional hash operations and point addition operations for simplicity. Comparing with bilinear pairings and scalar multiplications, these operations are much more efficient and negeleted. Denote P be bilinear pairing operation, E be pairing-based scalar multiplication, EM be ECC-based scalar multiplication, E X be exponentiation in group , H be map-to-point hash operation, I be inverse operation, and "pre" be pre-computed operation. Assume the bit-length of group element in  is 512 bits, and the goup order q = 160 bits. T ≈ . Fig. 1 shows the computational cost of signature creation and verification for all the compared schemes, while the time needed to execute the precomputed operations is neglected.Without using any expensive computations like bilinear parings, our scheme is the most computationally efficient. 
CONCLUSIONS
This paper presented the first certificateless strong designated verifier signature scheme without using pairing or map-to-point hash operations. Our scheme satisfies all the required security properties of CL-SDVS, that is unforgeability against both Type I and Type II forgers, non-transferability, strongness and the stronger notion nondelegatability. The formal security proofs were based on the intractability of SCDH and ECDL assumptions in the random oracle model. Furthermore, our CL-SDVS scheme achieves higher efficiency and outperforms all the known CL-(S)DVS schemes in this literature. The signature length is also very short. Signature-Generation Signature-Verification
